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The announcement of Citicorp’s merger with
Travelers Insurance, and much of the accompa-
nying commentary by banking observers and
consultants, included many references to  cross-
marketing opportunities, one-stop shopping,
and other potential scope economies—the gains
from having a single firm provide different goods
or services.  Some skeptics have noted that these
scope economies, which seem so plausible, have
been difficult to exploit profitably.   The diversi-
fication strategies of financial firms from Sears
to American Express have been notable more for
unfulfilled expectations than for high profits.
While financial firms keep searching for the
secret formula to make profits out of providing
multiple financial services under one roof, non-
financial firms seem headed in the opposite di-
rection. For well over a decade, CEOs in the non-
financial sector have increasingly shunned
terms such as synergies; currently, their man-
tras are corporate focus and a renewed emphasis
on core businesses and core competencies. For the
last few years, economists have been working to
document, understand, and evaluate both mar-
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ket participants’ romance with the idea of cor-
porate focus and the problems of diversified
firms. So far, the evidence mainly supports busi-
ness consultants’ arguments that focused firms
are more profitable.
Why are financial firms diversifying while
nonfinancial firms are becoming more focused?
It’s possible that different industries require dif-
ferent strategies. The ruling wisdom in nonfi-
nancial markets may not apply to financial mar-
kets, which have been fragmented by regulatory
restrictions for much of the last century. Also,
there are vagaries in the ways we define prod-
ucts and services. It is not clear whether Citicorp
and Travelers even provide different products, if
“products” are broadly defined; both firms de-
liver retail financial services.
Still, the evidence from nonfinancial markets
may be instructive to bankers, investors, and also
policymakers as they evaluate the potential ben-
efits and costs of the growth of large financial
conglomerates, the most likely immediate out-
come of the product expansions envisioned in
recent financial modernization bills. Plus, a bet-
ter understanding of the changing patterns of
diversification in nonfinancial industries can
provide insight into the likely evolution of fi-
nancial markets less fettered by regulatory
boundaries.
TRENDS IN DIVERSIFICATION
When a business chooses to expand into a
new product line, it can take a number of direc-
tions. Consider Mama Tried, Inc. (MT), a spe-
cialized manufacturer of buckled rubber ga-
loshes for children, whose managers anticipate
a period of slow growth in demand, as the last
baby-boomers’ children become teenagers. MT
could seek to exploit its reputation for produc-
ing quality raingear by buying a new factory to
produce raincoats. Alternatively, the firm could
branch into producing rubber hoses, hoping for
quantity discounts from the suppliers of its most
important input (synthetic rubber).  Finally, MT
might try to eliminate haggling with its  suppli-
ers altogether by purchasing its main supplier
of synthetic rubber outright.
Most of us would consider any of these
choices as related product extensions that do not
change the firm’s degree of focus: (i) raincoats
and galoshes are similar products;  (ii) rubber
hoses and rubber galoshes share a common in-
put; and (iii) MT and its rubber supplier are ver-
tically related, that is, MT uses an input pro-
duced by the rubber supplier.  We would not
view any of these moves as a change of focus, that
is, a move into a new product market.  (But see
Classifying Product Markets in a World That Re-
sists Classification.) Of course, the firm could
branch into producing auto parts, a market that
almost anyone would classify as unrelated to
the production of galoshes. For example, if MT
purchases another firm that owns an automo-
tive metal stamping plant, the merger would be
classified as a conglomerate merger and a change
in focus.
Firms Diversified in the 1960s and 1970s...
Between the end of World War II and the begin-
ning of the 1970s, firms increasingly sought to
expand into unrelated product lines (Table 1).
These expansions occurred as the pace of merger
activity quickened.
What about the economy as a whole during
this period? Although there are no systematic
data on changes in the degree of diversification
for all firms,  David Ravenscraft and Frederick
Scherer examined a sample of 471 manufactur-
ing firms that participated in the Federal Trade
Commission’s (FTC) Line of Business survey
between 1975 and 1978. These firms owned ap-
proximately 70 percent of the plant and equip-
ment of the U.S. manufacturing sector at that time,
so they offer a fairly comprehensive picture of
changing business practices in the manufactur-
ing sector and, perhaps, in the economy as a
whole.
The authors found that firms in all size classes
operated in many more product markets in 1975
than they had 25 years earlier (Table 2). This
conglomerate merger wave generated a host ofJack of All Trades? Product Diversification in Nonfinancial Firms Mitchell Berlin
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Classifying Markets
In a World That Resists Classification
The standard industrial classification (SIC) has been used for the last 60 years by economists to
identify the products produced by a firm (or firm segment).  The code identifies a product in much the
same way that a zip code identifies a neighborhood.  The first number assigns a product to a very
broad category, for example, 0 places a product in the category agriculture, forestry, and fishing, while
1 identifies the category mining. Each subsequent number distinguishes the product at a progressively
finer level. Although some establishments report detail down to the seven-digit level, the finest level
of detail available for all establishments is the six-digit level, for example, SIC 282104, Plastic resins
consumed in the form of granules, pellets, powders, liquids, etc., except sheets, rods, tubes, and shapes.
SIC codes are tremendously useful, but as with any system of categories, there will inevitably be
arbitrary choices. Let’s take a look at Mama Tried.  At the four-digit level, children’s galoshes are
classified under Rubber and Plastics Footwear (SIC 3021).  If MT starts producing children’s raincoats, it
has entered a new two-digit industry, Apparel and Other Textile Products (SIC 23), which includes
Waterproof Outerwear (SIC 2385).  But if it begins to produce rubber hoses—included in Rubber and
Miscellaneous Plastics Products (SIC 30)—MT hasn’t entered a new two-digit industry, since both ga-
loshes and hoses share the same first two digits (30).  Are children’s galoshes and raincoats more or
less related than galoshes and hoses are?  Now, if MT buys its supplier of synthetic rubber—the main
input into galoshes—it enters a new industry at the one-digit level, Chemicals and Allied Products (SIC
28), since the first digit of the new industry (2) is different from that of galoshes (3).  But shouldn’t
vertically related products be treated as related?*
But even if products could be defined with complete precision, an even more fundamental prob-
lem remains. The number of products produced by a firm is only one way of determining a firm’s
degree of focus, a point made forcefully by Steve Kaplan and coauthors Mark Mitchell and Karen
Wruck. They present a case study of Cooper Industries Inc., a highly efficient manufacturer of com-
modity-type industrial products, that is, industrial products for which brand image, post-sale product
support, or other personal relationships don’t matter much. The firm’s expertise lies in the type of
production process at which it excels, rather than the particular products it manufactures. Thus, a firm
might produce a wide range of products, spanning the SIC system of codes, yet reasonably be viewed
as a highly focused firm. This problem is widely recognized by researchers, but it has not yet been
successfully addressed in empirical studies.
In March 1999, the Census Bureau began replacing the SIC system with the new North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS). While the earlier system defined product categories accord-
ing to multiple criteria, including the type of customer served and the underlying production process,
the new system adopts a single criterion, the nature of the production process.  Reflecting the rapid
introduction of new products in recent years, the NAICS has updated industry groupings and intro-
duced more categories at the one-digit level.  The Census Bureau intends to review and revise the
NAICS every five years to keep pace with changes in the economy.
*Thus, researchers can easily disagree about whether a particular decision to merge or acquire assets
involves a move into a related or an unrelated industry.  Researchers have used various techniques to
overcome this problem.  Allowing individual firms to have multiple SIC classifications or using broad
groupings (say, two-digit SIC codes) is a conservative approach, which avoids making excessively sharp
distinctions between firms’ products.  Some researchers have used input-output tables to ensure that verti-
cally related products are not classified as unrelated.  At least one researcher, David Scharfstein, took the
interesting approach of limiting his sample size so he could examine each firm in the sample and make a
personal judgment. Of course, each of these approaches presents difficulties.18 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA






in Pure Conglomerate Mergers
as a Share of Total Assets Acquired
theories about the potential benefits of corporate
diversification. (See The Arguments for Diversifi-
cation.)
...But They Got More Focused in the 1980s
and 1990s.  Using business segment data re-
ported by firms to the Securities and Exchange
Commission and measuring the degree of diver-
sification a number of different ways, Robert
Comment and Gregg Jarrell provide evidence that
the earlier trend toward diversification was re-
versed and that firms focused on fewer product
lines throughout the 1980s (Table 3). In fact, by
the end of the 1980s, over half of the firms in
their sample had only one business segment.1
TABLE 2
Increase from 1950
to 1975 in Number of Lines
of Business* for Firms
in the FTC’s Survey
Average Number of Lines of Business
Company rank in
terms of 1975 sales 1950 1975
Top 100 4.48 12.38
101-200 3.38   9.27
201-300 2.11   6.56
301-400 1.73   4.85
401-471 1.62   3.42
All 471 Firms 2.73   7.54
*Lines of business are classified into 261 sepa-
rate manufacturing categories at the four-digit
level (compared to 451 four-digit SIC codes for
manufacturing in 1972).  Respondents were in-
structed not to report separate lines of business
for vertically related products and were permitted
to exclude lines of business with sales less than
$10 million.
Source: Ravenscraft and Scherer, p. 28.
1While the weight of the evidence points to an in-
crease in focus since the 1980s, Cynthia Montgomery
makes the telling point that diversification across mul-
tiple product lines is still very much the norm for the
largest businesses in the U.S.  In fact, some of our most
successful and profitable firms—General Electric, for ex-
ample—remain highly diversified.  Montgomery finds
that between 1985 and 1989 (and 1989 and 1992) prod-
uct diversification for the 500 largest U.S. public compa-
nies stayed roughly constant. This finding suggests that
the increase in the average level of focus found by Com-
ment and Jarrell was not true of the very largest firms in
the sample.
1948-77, Large Manufacturing & Mining Firms
1948-53 1956-63 1963-72 1973-77
3.2% 15.9% 33.2% 49.2%
1950-77, Manufacturing Firms
1950-55 1956-63 1964-72 1973-77
5.3% 18.4% 36.2% 32.4%
The wrenching corporate restructurings of the
1980s also point to a move toward greater focus
Source: Ravenscraft and Scherer, pp. 23, 24.  Num-
bers for 1948-77 are taken from the Federal Trade
Commission; numbers for 1950-77 are from cal-
culations by Ravenscraft and Scherer.Jack of All Trades? Product Diversification in Nonfinancial Firms Mitchell Berlin
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in the United States. The 1980s were a volatile
period in the market for control over corporate
assets.  Assets were sold off to acquirers and
spun off as independent firms by corporate raid-
ers, and the incumbent managers of firms did
much the same, partly in fear of becoming a
raider’s next target. To a significant extent, we
can view the restructurings of the 1980s as an
undoing of the excesses of the preceding move-
ment toward diversification.
At least three studies have documented this
process.  Following the fortunes of the 471 manu-
facturing firms in the FTC’s Line of Business
survey—which accounted for three-fourths of
the mergers among all manufacturing firms be-
tween 1950 and 1976—Ravenscraft and Scherer
estimated that one-third of assets purchased be-
tween 1960 and 1976 were ultimately divested.
In numerous case studies and using economet-
ric analyses, they found that conglomerate merg-
ers were the most likely to be undone by selling
unrelated assets.
Looking at a narrower sample of 271 large
acquisitions completed between 1971 and 1982,
Steven Kaplan and Michael Weisbach discov-
ered a similar pattern.  In their sample, 44 per-
cent of the firms purchased were ultimately sold
off to other firms, spun off as free-standing firms,
or liquidated outright.  These divestitures typi-
cally led to an increase in focus, both for the di-
vesting firms and for firms in the aggregate.2
Sanjai Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert
The Arguments for Diversification
The Benefits of Internal Capital Markets. A firm’s cash flows can be paid out to bondholders and
stockholders, who can then choose how to reinvest the funds, perhaps investing them in another
firm. Alternatively, the firm’s head office can retain earnings internally and decide how funds should
be distributed within the firm—what economists call an internal capital market.  Oliver Williamson has
argued that the head office of a conglomerate may be better equipped than market participants to
evaluate the relative profitability of investment projects.  Milton Harris and Artur Raviv showed that
a firm’s head office can better design efficient reward and evaluation schemes for capital budgeting
purposes. Glenn Hubbard and Darius Palia have provided some evidence that during the diversifi-
cation wave of the 1960s, investors recognized the benefits of internal capital markets.
The Resource View. Cynthia Montgomery and Birger Wernerfelt have argued that firms seek to
extend the use of fixed resources, such as managerial skill, as long as such use is profitable.  For
example, a firm might diversify outside its core market into less profitable markets if it has ex-
hausted profitable opportunities in its core market but the firm’s managers have spare time.  Inter-
estingly, this view predicts a negative relationship between diversification and measures of the
profitability of the firm’s investment opportunities (because the firm has moved into a less profitable
market). But contrary to theories of inefficient diversification (which are examined in greater detail
in the body of this article), the firm’s diversifying investments don’t reduce firm profits.
Tax Benefits. A temporarily unprofitable division’s losses can be set off against the total profits of
the firm to reduce the firm’s tax bill. Empirical evidence shows that such tax benefits help explain a
firm’s gains from diversification, but the potential gains from being able to offset profits are rela-
tively small.
2The original target firm—the firm initially acquired—
was four times more likely to be sold off eventually if its
business was unrelated to that of its initial acquirer. Only
20 percent of the assets divested were purchased by an
unrelated firm, while 43 percent of the sales were to
firms in related businesses.  Kaplan and Weisbach view
two firms as unrelated if the firms' four most important
lines of business, as reported in Dun and Bradstreet’s
Million Dollar Directory, don’t have at least one three-
digit SIC code in common.20 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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Vishny provided corroborating evidence of a “re-
turn to specialization” in the 1980s through cor-
porate restructurings. Using a sample of 62 suc-
cessful hostile takeovers between 1984 and 1986,
these authors found that fully 72 percent of the
assets changing hands ultimately ended up in
the hands of buyers in related businesses.3
WHY HAVE NONFINANCIAL FIRMS
INCREASED FOCUS?
Studies suggest that firms usually become less
profitable when they become more diversified.
Ravenscraft and Scherer followed their 471
manufacturing firms for a number of years, both
preceding and following a merger. They found
that during the conglomerate merger wave of the
TABLE 3
Getting Focused in the 1980s
Fiscal year Number Percent with Average number Average number
of firmsa one segmentb of segments of SIC codesc
1979 2,008 38.1 2.53 4.09
1980 2,000 38.8 2.50 4.08
1981 1,991 40.2 2.45 4.03
1982 1,959 40.9 2.42 3.98
1983 1,963 41.8 2.38 3.91
1984 1,934 43.4 2.30 3.78
1985 1,917 46.0 2.20 3.63
1986 1,938 50.3 2.08 3.46
1987 2,038 53.6 2.00 3.32
1988 2,085 55.7 1.94 3.23
aExchange-listed firms covered by Compustat
bNote that segments and lines of business, referred to in Table 2,  are drawn from separate data sets and
are not directly comparable.  The SEC defines a segment as that part of a firm that: (i) produces at least 10
percent of the firm’s revenues; (ii) produces a product that is substantially different from products produced
by the firm’s other segments; and (iii) is not vertically related in production to the firm’s other segments. See
the article by Frank Lichtenberg and the one by Philip Berger and Eli Ofek (1995) for discussions of some of
the pitfalls of using segment data to measure diversification.
cSIC code at the four-digit level
Source: Comment and Jarrell, p. 71
3Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny include firms in which
the hostile takeover led to temporary control by a lever-
aged buyout firm that subsequently sold off segments
to purchasers in related industries.  The authors are not
explicit about their criteria for deciding whether two prod-
ucts are related.Jack of All Trades? Product Diversification in Nonfinancial Firms Mitchell Berlin
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1960s and early 1970s, the typical purchaser
acquired a firm that had been performing better
than others in its industry. Nonetheless, the
merged firms’ performance usually deteriorated,
and conglomerate  mergers were the ones that
fared the worst, according to accounting mea-
sures of performance.4
Firms also seem to become more profitable
when they increase their focus. Lane Daley, Vikas
Mehrotra, and Ranjini Sivakumar examined the
subsequent performance of a sample of 212
spinoffs between 1975 and 1991. In a spinoff,
part of a firm is split off and becomes indepen-
dent.5  Prior to Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar’s
work, many studies had found that a parent
firm’s stock price typically rises when a spinoff
is announced (in economist’s lingo, a positive
announcement effect), evidence that market par-
ticipants view a spinoff as good news about the
firm’s future profitability. But why? The authors
discovered that this positive announcement ef-
fect was actually confined to those firms spin-
ning off an unrelated segment, but other spinoffs
had no positive effect on stock prices at all, evi-
dence that market participants expect higher
profits with an increase in focus.6
The authors then examined the subsequent
performance of both the original firms and of the
spun-off firms to see whether market partici-
pants’ optimism was rewarded. Corroborating
the stock market evidence, the authors discov-
ered improved operating performance at the par-
ent firm, but only if the parent and the spinoff
were in unrelated markets.
More Evidence From the Stock Market About
the Benefits of Focus.  In the 1980s and 1990s,
stock market participants have consistently re-
warded focus and penalized diversification by
paying less for the stocks of diversified firms than
for those of their specialized counterparts, the
so-called diversification discount.
Philip Berger and Eli Ofek have written a num-
ber of influential articles developing the “chop
shop” approach to measuring the diversifica-
tion discount.7  In this approach, the authors look
at each of the diversified firm’s segments sepa-
rately and compare them to a representative spe-
cialized firm in the same industry.8  This com-
4But note that economists are always skeptical of the
uncritical use of accounting measures of economic per-
formance.  See the article by Steven Kaplan and coau-
thors Mark Mitchell and Karen Wruck for some interest-
ing examples of instances in which accounting measures
misrepresent the performance of firms following a merger.
5Spinoffs are especially interesting because an ana-
lyst can follow the subsequent performance of a firm
that is spun off, as well as the performance of its former
owner. When a firm is sold, such an analysis often can’t
be done because the firm becomes part of the acquirer.
6In Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar’s study, the par-
ent and the spinoff were defined as unrelated if they did
not share an industry classification at the two-digit level.
At this broad level of classification, most analysts would
agree whether two firms are related.
7The chop shop approach was first used by Dean
LeBaron and Lawrence Speidell. There are two main vari-
ants. In the first, Berger and Ofek calculate a representa-
tive stand-alone firm’s ratio of sales to market value and
apply this ratio to a segment’s sales to calculate the
segment’s hypothetical market value. (The representa-
tive firm in an industry is defined as the specialized firm
with the median value of the ratio.)  They also repeat the
procedure using the ratios of assets to market value and
earnings to market value to obtain two additional esti-
mates.  The second approach compares the diversified
firm’s actual market value with a hypothetical market
value for the sum of its segments. This hypothetical value
is calculated using q—the ratio of a firm’s market value
to the book value of its assets, which is often used to
measure the market’s valuation of a firm’s investment
prospects. The diversified firm’s hypothetical market
value is a weighted average of the q-ratios of representa-
tive specialized firms, one for each segment of the diver-
sified firm. Berger and Ofek’s 1995 article has a good
discussion of the problems with each approach.
8Berger and Ofek define the industry at the four-digit
level if there are at least five stand-alone firms in that
four-digit-level industry; the authors move to the three-
digit level if there are less than five stand-alone firms at
the four-digit level, and so on.22 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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parison is used to hypothetically chop up the
firm and determine how much each segment
would fetch in the market—its hypothetical
stand-alone value.  Comparing the stand-alone
values of the diversified firm’s segments and the
firm’s actual market value provides a measure
of the diversification discount.9
  In their 1995 study, Berger and Ofek found
not only that a diversification discount exists
but that this discount is large: it averages about
15 percent of the value of the firm as a whole.  If
such a large discount exists in practice (and not
just hypothetically), why don’t the stockholders
of such a firm force its managers to sell or spin
off assets or demand other changes in the diver-
sified firm’s policy to raise its value?
In a 1997 study, Berger and Ofek, as well as
other researchers, answer that this is exactly
what happens. Firms with larger diversification
discounts are substantially more likely to re-
structure to increase the firm’s focus. Echoing
the results for spinoffs, investigators have found
that stock market participants respond favorably
to asset sales and divestitures that increase the
selling firm’s degree of focus.10
SOURCES OF THE
DIVERSIFICATION DISCOUNT
Recent empirical evidence alerts us to the dif-
ficulties of running a diversified firm profitably.
Why is it so difficult to make a profit?
Jack of All Trades, Master of None?  One
simple and intuitive explanation has found par-
ticular favor in the business press. Staying fo-
cused on closely related products is the corpo-
rate version of following the well-known adage
“stick to what you know.” In this view, a
manager’s expertise is specific to a particular
product; operating in multiple markets may tax
the manager’s attention and abilities.  In a closely
related view, some economists say that design-
ing the right incentives for managers gets pro-
gressively harder as new products are added
and the operating environment becomes more
complicated.11
The empirical evidence for this view comes
mostly from case studies of conglomerate merg-
ers, in which the managers of the acquiring firm
simply didn’t understand the subtleties of the
new markets they were entering.12  Kaplan and
coauthors quote a former manager for Premark,
a diversified producer of plastic laminates and
other home products (including Tupperware).
Referring to his firm’s troubled acquisition of a
previously successful producer of decorative
kitchen tiles, he said, “We did not know the deco-
rative products business; we knew laminates.”
Kaplan and coauthors also illustrated the
complexities of maintaining appropriate incen-
tives and controls for different types of markets.
In a case study of Cooper Industries’ purchase
of Cameron Inc., they detailed Cooper’s central-
ized control over even the tiniest expenses—a
key to Cooper’s prowess in the production of
standardized products. (Cooper’s success in
introducing this system in the firms it acquired
was so widely admired that industry observers 9The sum of the stand-alone values can be lower than
that of the actual firm.  In that case, the market would be
saying the firm is worth more than the sum of its parts,
and we would be speaking of a diversification premium.
10Kose John and Eli Ofek present the evidence for
asset sales, and Berger and Ofek present the evidence for
divestitures in their 1996 study. Of course, even if mar-
ket participants are correct in discounting the value of a
diversified firm, the costs of making a transition to a new
(more focused) organizational form may outweigh any
potential gains, and shareholders would not necessarily
support any such change.
11Chaim Fershtman and Ehud Kalai propose an at-
tractive model of the difficulties for managers of firms
operating in complex environments based on managers’
limited cognitive abilities.  Julio Rotemberg and Garth
Saloner analyze some of the difficulties in giving manag-
ers appropriate incentives when a firm operates in mul-
tiple markets.
12Ravenscraft and Scherer provide numerous case
studies that support this view.Jack of All Trades? Product Diversification in Nonfinancial Firms Mitchell Berlin
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had coined the term cooperization.) However,
detailed expense control from the top was viewed
as wasteful meddling by Cameron’s managers,
who saw personal relationships with custom-
ers—not saving nickels and dimes—as the key
to success.
The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets:
Corporate Socialism?  The idea that the manag-
ers of a diversified firm might have an advan-
tage over poorly informed capital market par-
ticipants in deciding how to allocate funds is
one of the most convincing arguments in favor
of diversification.  But the empirical evidence
has increasingly supported an alternative, less
optimistic view of internal capital markets.13  Re-
cent evidence suggests that internal capital mar-
kets are prone to propping up poorly perform-
ing segments by shifting corporate money from
more profitable to less profitable uses.14
First, diversified firms that have a segment
with negative cash flow suffer a greater loss in
value than specialized firms with negative cash
flow, evidence that diversified firms stick with
losers longer than would the marketplace.15  Sec-
ond, segments of diversified firms typically in-
vest more than comparable stand-alone firms in
the same industry.16  But does higher investment
indicate a problem or a benefit of internal capi-
tal markets?  A third finding says that it’s a prob-
lem.  Segments in industries with strong invest-
ment prospects invest less than their stand-alone
counterparts, while segments in industries with
poor investment prospects invest more than their
stand-alone counterparts.17  Finally, Rajan,
Servaes, and Zingales found that the shifting of
funds from winners to losers is greatest in those
firms in which different segments have widely
divergent investment prospects. This result is
consistent with the authors’ own view of the in-
ternal capital market, in which the head office
“buys” the cooperation of segments with weaker
prospects by shifting funds in their direction.18
13An internal capital market is an economist’s term
for a firm’s practice of allocating cash flows to new in-
vestments within the firm, rather than returning cash to
stockholders and bondholders as dividends or interest
payments and, thus, allowing the funds to be reallo-
cated through financial markets.
14Much of the empirical evidence for inefficiency is
based on the assumption that market participants’ evalu-
ation of a firm’s prospects is usually right.  Vojislav
Maksimovic and Gordon Phillips have also criticized the
previous literature, arguing that an explicit model of op-
timal investment behavior by multiproduct firms is
needed to determine whether a particular pattern of ob-
served behavior is inefficient. They provide evidence that
differences in the investment behavior between conglom-
erate and specialized producers can be explained as the
outcome of efficient investment decisions in a market
that includes both conglomerate and specialized firms.
15This has been documented by Berger and Ofek
(1995).
16This has been documented by Berger and Ofek
(1995); Hyun-Han Shin and Rene Stulz;  David
Scharfstein; and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales.
17This tendency for firms to shift funds from winners
to losers has been termed corporate socialism by David
Scharfstein.  It has been documented by Owen Lamont,
by Scharfstein, and by Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales. Shin
and Stulz also show that a segment’s own investment
level doesn’t depend on its own prospects compared
with those of the other segments of the firm. This finding
is further evidence of inefficient investments.
18In this interesting model, the firm’s divisions bar-
gain for funds, and divisions can sometimes increase
their bargaining power by making investments that do
not benefit the corporation as a whole.  This behavior is
most likely for divisions with poor investment prospects.
By increasing weaker divisions’ share of corporate funds,
the head office buys their cooperation and induces them
to make profit-maximizing investments. For example, a
weak division’s managers can be induced to forgo an
investment that increases the division’s own visibility
outside the corporation—but doesn’t increase the
corporation’s profits—only as part of an ongoing bar-
gain in which they get a disproportionate share of corpo-
rate funds for investment.  In the model, inefficient trans-
fers arise only when a firm’s segments have very dissimi-
lar prospects; diversification per se is not the source of the
problem.24 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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Some Evidence From Banking Markets.  Al-
though the literature has mostly examined non-
financial firms, banking scholars have uncov-
ered evidence of internal capital markets in bank
holding companies.  Consistent with the evi-
dence from nonfinancial firms, findings from a
study by Joel Houston, Christopher James, and
David Marcus showed that loan growth in a
bank subsidiary is affected by its holding
company’s cash flow, rather than its own cash
flow.  In addition, loan volume grows faster at a
bank when the cash flows of nonbank subsidiar-
ies of the bank’s holding company are high, thus
demonstrating that the holding company’s in-
ternal capital market leads to bank lending deci-
sions different from those that would be made
by a stand-alone bank.  However, unlike the lit-
erature on nonfinancial organizations, there is,
so far, no empirical evidence of inefficiency.19
IF FOCUS IS SO GREAT, WHY DID FIRMS
DIVERSIFY IN THE FIRST PLACE?
The extensive evidence for a diversification
discount has given rise to lively debate.  How
did it arise in the first place, and why does it
persist?  Have stockholders always penalized
diversified firms? If the answer to this last ques-
tion is yes, then managers, not stockholders, were
the intended beneficiaries of diversification. For
example, some financial economists argue that
stockholders suffer from managers’ desire to
build great empires rather than to increase prof-
its.20
The Behavior of the Diversification Dis-
count Over Time Is a Puzzle.  In three separate
papers, Henri Servaes, John Matsusaka, and
Peter Klein provided evidence that stockholders
supported diversifying mergers during the early
1970s, the latter part of the conglomerate merger
wave.  That is, it appears that the diversification
discount did not exist during the first half of the
1970s.  This finding supports the view that the
diversification wave of the late 1960s and early
1970s may have been a mistake, but not the view
that it was a victory for managerial self-interest
over stockholder value.
But Servaes also found that stock markets
imposed a significant penalty on diversifying
mergers throughout the 1960s, the period in
which conglomerate mergers first picked up
speed and then peaked (according to most mea-
sures).  Thus, evidence from the stock market
doesn’t fully support the view that it is only with
20-20 hindsight that stockholders found out that
most conglomerate mergers were against their
best interests. This historical pattern in which
stockholders penalized diversification through-
out the 1960s, changed their minds in the first
half of the 1970s, then shifted back again in the
1980s and 1990s remains a puzzle that no exist-
ing theory has explained convincingly.
Maybe the Economy Has Changed.  The in-
creasing diversification that occurred from 1950
to 1975, which was followed by a trend toward
greater focus in the 1980s and 1990s, has led
some economists to hunt for changes in the
economy that might have made diversification
attractive at first, but less so later on.
19Peter Klein and Marc Saidenberg found that banks
within bank holding companies lend more than other-
wise similar stand-alone banks and are equally profit-
able.  Hence, beneficial geographical diversification ef-
fects within bank holding companies are not outweighed
by the types of organizational difficulties that have been
found in diversified nonfinancial firms.  However, note
that this result does not imply that product diversifica-
tion in financial firms will prove to be more efficient than
for nonfinancial firms.  It is reasonable to view lending in
Delaware and lending in Illinois as substantially the same
financial product, at least once a bank has gained suffi-
cient experience.
20Empire building is only one reason managers might
have a desire to diversify even against stockholders’ in-
terests.  Some economists, for example, Yakov Amihud
and Baruch Lev, have argued that managers seek to re-
duce their own risks at investors’ expense by diversifying
into different markets.Jack of All Trades? Product Diversification in Nonfinancial Firms Mitchell Berlin
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For example, antitrust policy changed under
the Reagan administration and could have gen-
erated a trend toward greater focus.21  Until the
1980s, horizontal mergers—mergers between
firms in the same product markets—were viewed
with hostility by the antitrust authorities.  Ac-
cording to one account, the hostility of the Jus-
tice Department kept a lid on combinations be-
tween large firms in the same market, until the
Reagan years ushered in a new antitrust policy
that was less suspicious of concentrated mar-
kets. This change permitted a return to special-
ization.
Unfortunately, the evidence doesn’t offer
much support for this view.  John Matsusaka
has presented compelling evidence from the
early 1970s that large firms—firms subject to
surveillance by the Justice Department—and
small firms—firms unlikely to attract the Justice
Department’s attention—were equally likely to
merge with a firm in an unrelated market.  Since
antitrust considerations don’t seem to explain
conglomerate mergers, why view the move to
greater focus as a belated attempt to assemble
firms that were previously forbidden?  In fact,
there is evidence that the mergers, acquisitions,
and asset sales that occurred between 1981 and
1989 didn’t actually increase concentration on
average.22
Another possibility is that capital markets
became more efficient at allocating funds and
assets and at disciplining poor managers.23  In
this view, internal capital markets may have been
necessary in the 1950s and 1960s, but the stock
and bond markets can now do the job better.
It is easy to point to fundamental changes that
have increased the efficiency of capital markets
as a means of mobilizing funds and keeping a
check on managers. For example, the deregula-
tion of investment banking fees and shelf regis-
tration have made it cheaper and easier for firms
to go to capital markets to get funds.24 Using junk
bonds to finance mergers was an innovation of
the 1980s. The growth of large institutions with
big investments in individual firms has forced
managers to pay more attention to investors.
This vision of competing corporate gover-
nance mechanisms is a tempting explanation,
but it is also one that relies on loose, albeit plau-
sible, connections among a lot of different events
rather than on formal empirical tests.  Before ac-
cepting this explanation, most economists would
insist on more concrete evidence.
  Managers and Stockholders Don’t Always
Agree.  Although the evidence doesn’t provide
strong support for the view that the conglomer-
ate merger wave was driven by managers’ inter-
ests alone, there is growing evidence that man-
agers and stockholders often don’t see eye to eye
on the benefits of diversification.25
Perhaps the most convincing evidence for
conflict between managers and stockholders has
been assembled by Berger and Ofek (1997), who
compare a sample of firms that refocused be-
tween 1983 and 1994 to another group of other-
wise similar diversified firms. Firms that refo-
21This hypothesis was initially posed by Ravenscraft
and Scherer.
22Julia Porter Liebeskind, Tim Opler, and Donald
Hatfield’s study found a modest  increase in concentra-
tion, but it was the result of exit by small firms and the
internal growth of existing firms.  They define industries
at the four-digit SIC level.
23See Amar Bhide’s article.
24Shelf registration allows firms to issue securities
multiple times, without having to undergo the entire
battery of reporting and registration requirements im-
posed by the SEC for a new issue.
25Note, the diversification discount doesn’t, by itself,
prove that diversified firms are being held together over
stockholders’ opposition.  For example, managers and
stockholders might  agree that an increase in focus would
raise profits, but not enough to outweigh the costs of
reallocating assets through sale, spinoff, or merger.26 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
BUSINESS REVIEW MAY/JUNE 1999
cused were much more likely to have replaced
their management during the preceding year—
evidence that stockholders intervened not only
to increase firm focus but also to replace the
management identified with the firm’s prior strat-
egy.  Firms that refocused were also much more
likely to have introduced a stock option com-
pensation scheme for managers.  Often, such
schemes are intended to motivate managers to
make decisions in stockholders’ interests. Thus,
refocusing is often undertaken as part of a strat-
egy to make stockholders’ interests paramount.
In general, Berger and Ofek’s evidence paints a
picture in which firms undertake a strategy of
increasing firm focus mainly when stockhold-
ers are successful in exerting more control.
Other studies have shown that if a firm’s
ownership structure promotes stockholders’ in-
terests first and foremost, the firm is also more
likely to be focused.26  Firms with higher mana-
gerial stock holdings are typically more focused,
perhaps because higher stock holdings give
managers financial incentives more like those of
stockholders. In addition, firms with large out-
side investors—that is, investors not closely al-
lied with top management—are more likely to
be focused.  Large outside investors can exercise
more influence over a firm’s policy than can small
investors, and they can exercise this influence
on behalf of stockholders if they are indepen-
dent of top management.
CONCLUSION
Nonfinancial firms have become more fo-
cused since the 1980s.  This shift reversed the
previous postwar trend of increasing diversifi-
cation, which culminated in the conglomerate
merger wave of the 1960s and early 1970s. Fi-
nancial market participants now reward focus
and penalize diversification by paying lower
stock prices for diversified firms, the so-called
diversification discount. This pattern of rewards
and penalties appears to be more than a whim-
sical choice by stockholders, since studies sug-
gest that diversification often hurts a firm’s per-
formance.  While the costs of diversification re-
main somewhat mysterious, recent empirical
evidence points to inefficient investment deci-
sions by diversified firms. In particular, there is
evidence that diversified firms tend to prop up
poorly performing divisions by transferring re-
sources from more profitable divisions.
In light of the evidence from nonfinancial
markets, investors may be skeptical about claims
of large benefits from diversification by finan-
cial firms, especially if firms diversify very far
afield from their core businesses. They should
be particularly skeptical of the claim that diver-
sified financial firms are best capable of respond-
ing quickly to shifting market conditions, that
is, that resources can be more easily shifted from
declining to promising markets within a diver-
sified firm than through the marketplace.  In fact,
preliminary evidence points to problems in shift-
ing resources toward their most profitable use
as the most likely culprit behind the diversifica-
tion discount.
Recent evidence from nonfinancial markets
may also provide policymakers with hints about
how markets will evolve over time if financial
firms can offer a wider range of products and
services.  The evidence does not support the view
that giant, diversified financial and commercial
conglomerates are a necessary outcome of prod-
uct deregulation. Financial firms free to choose
their mix of products are unlikely to obey regu-
latory boundaries drawn in the first half of the
20th century, but product deregulation may still
ultimately lead to markets composed of special-
ized financial firms. Evidence from nonfinan-
cial markets says there are limits to profitable
product diversification, and market participants
have increasingly pressed firms to recognize
these limits.
26The evidence in this paragraph is from the articles
by Berger and Ofek (1996), and David Denis, Diane
Denis, and Atulya Sarin (1997).Jack of All Trades? Product Diversification in Nonfinancial Firms Mitchell Berlin
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